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Modal Panentheism 
 
Yujin Nagasawa 
 
 
 
 
 
“What could be more stupid than to deny that supreme excellence to that universal 
nature which embraces all things?”—Cicero 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Modal panentheism consists primarily of the following two theses: 
 
(1) God is the totality of all possible worlds. 
(2) All possible worlds exist to the same extent that the actual world does.  
 
As I explain in detail below, the first thesis can be construed as a version of pantheism 
or panentheism depending on how we understand the ontological status of possible 
worlds. The second thesis is what metaphysicians call modal realism.1 It says that the 
actual world is not the only possible world that exists; all possible worlds exist and 
they are as real as the actual world. So modal panentheism says that all possible 
worlds exist and God is the totality of those worlds. 
The aim of this paper is to consider modal panentheism as an alternative to 
traditional theism. In Section 2, I argue that we can derive modal panentheism—
perhaps counterintuitively—from the Anselmian definition of God, which is widely 
accepted among traditional theists. In Section 3, I argue that the modal panentheistic 
God shares many specific great-making properties that are commonly ascribed to God 
by traditional theists. Such properties include omniscience, omnipotence, 
omnibenevolence, immutability, impassibility, eternity, necessary existence, 
omnipresence, independence, unsurpassability, and the property of being a cause of 
the universe. 2 In Section 4, I argue that modal panentheism provides compelling 
answers to many difficult problems in the philosophy of religion, such as the problem 
of evil, the problem of no best possible world, the fine-tuning problem, the timing 
problem for the beginning of the universe, and the question why there is anything 
rather than nothing. However, I argue in Section 5 that there is a variation of the 
problem of evil for modal panentheism which is difficult to resolve. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The Anselmian Definition of God 
Traditional theism so-called is shared across the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. It 
is widely agreed that traditional theism is based on the definition of God (or a close 
variant thereof) introduced or anticipated by Anselm in the eleventh century: 
                                                          
1 Modal realism is most notably defended by David Lewis (1986). 
2 The ascriptions of these attributes to God are matters of dispute. For example, it is 
disputed whether or not God is eternal. Some claim that God’s relationship with time 
should rather be understood as timelessness or omnitemporality. I set these disputes 
aside in this paper. 
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(3) God is that than which no greater can be thought.  
 
Anselm famously uses this definition to construct the ontological argument for the 
existence of God (Anselm, originally 1077–1078, 1979). 
How does traditional theism interpret the above definition? More specifically, 
how does it interpret the notion of greatness in the definition? Harwood presents the 
most common interpretation as follows: God (or the Maximally Great Being, as 
Harwood calls it) ‘is one that has all possible positive qualities to the highest possible 
extent and is totally devoid of negative qualities’ (Harwood 1999, p. 478). So, for 
example, if knowledge, power and benevolence are positive qualities (or great-making 
properties) while ignorance, vulnerability and malevolence are negative qualities (or 
worse-making properties), then God has knowledge, power and benevolence to the 
highest possible extent while totally lacking ignorance, vulnerability and 
malevolence.3 Based on this interpretation traditional theism typically holds that God 
is an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, immutable, impassible, eternal, 
necessarily existent, omnipresent, independent, unsurpassable, personal cause of the 
universe.4 
Modal panentheism appears to differ radically from traditional theism, where the 
nature of God is at stake. Surprisingly enough, however, we can also derive modal 
panentheism from the Anselmian definition of God, albeit based on an alternative 
interpretation of that definition according to which greatness in the definition of God 
should be understood not in terms of the extent of positivity or great-making there is 
but in terms of the scope of that which it encompasses. So, on this interpretation, the 
more encompassing a being is the higher the greatness of that being is. It is easily 
overlooked but pantheists and panentheists often understand God’s greatness in this 
way. God’s complete comprehensiveness, its capacity to encompass all of reality, 
represents God’s ultimate significance. God is the greatest being, according to this 
understanding, because God encompasses absolutely everything and there is nothing 
beyond it. Balbus, Cicero’s character in The Nature of Gods who defends Stoic 
pantheism says, for example, “What could be more stupid than to deny that supreme 
excellence to that universal nature which embraces all things?” (Cicero, originally 45 
BC, 1972, p. 137)5. According to this understanding, God, as that than which no 
                                                          
3 I use the term ‘it’ rather than ‘he’ or ‘she’ to refer to God throughout this paper 
because our main focus is on modal panentheism, which does not regard God as a 
person or personal being. 
4 There is a debate about whether or not God, or any being, can simultaneously have 
multiple great-making properties to the highest possible extent. Some people claim, 
for example, that it is impossible for God (or any other being) to be all-knowing and 
all-powerful simultaneously. I set this debate aside in this paper. See Nagasawa 
(2008).  
5 An anonymous referee doubts that this quote from Cicero supports the construal of 
greatness in terms of encompassment. The referee contends that Balbus says only that 
there is something which encompasses all things and it would be foolish not to call 
that thing great. According to the referee, that is not the same as saying that it is 
great because it encompasses all things.  
However, if encompassment has nothing to do with greatness, it is puzzling 
why Bulbus uses the phrase ‘that universal nature which embraces all things’ rather 
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greater can be thought, is the maximally encompassing being. And modal 
panentheism holds that such a being is the totality of all possible worlds as it 
encompasses everything. 
Suppose now that modal actualism is true, that is, only the actual world exists. In 
this case, insofar as existing things are concerned, the ‘totality of all possible worlds 
including the actual world’ is equivalent to the actual world alone because, according 
to modal actualism, everything that exists is actual and no merely possible worlds 
exist. This means that modal actualism and the thesis that God is the totality of all 
possible worlds jointly entail pantheism, according to which God is identical with the 
actual world.  
Modal panentheism says, on the other hand, that modal realism (i.e., thesis 2 
above) is true; that is, all possible worlds exist to the same extent that the actual world 
does. According to modal realism, actuality is merely indexical. There is no 
ontological difference between the actual world and other possible worlds. The actual 
world is special for us merely because it is our world, just as some other possible 
world is special for the inhabitants of that world. All possible worlds are ontologically 
on a par although they are causally isolated from one another.6 Given modal realism, 
the totality of all possible worlds including the actual world is more encompassing 
than the actual world alone is. Modal panentheism is a version of panentheism rather 
than pantheism because it entails existence beyond the actual world which we inhabit, 
namely, other possible worlds. That is, the actual world is only a proper part of God. 
(Having said that, I hasten to add that modal panentheism can be construed as a 
version of pantheism if we define pantheism as the view that God is identical with 
reality or the sum of all there is, rather than only the actual world which we inhabit. 
Ultimately, therefore, it is a matter of definition whether modal panentheism is a 
version of pantheism or panentheism.) 
Pantheism is known to face the problem of unity: How can we consider the world 
a single unified entity given that it consists of uncountably many individual objects? 
Modal panentheism faces a parallel problem: How can we consider the totality of all 
possible worlds a single unified entity given that it consists of uncountably many 
individual objects? Pantheists typically appeal to causal links or the laws of nature to 
explain the unity, but modal panentheists may be able to maintain a stronger unity by 
appealing to a unity that is based on modality. If our world is a four-dimensional 
                                                                                                                                                                      
than simply ‘that universal nature’. The quote in question follows this passage, which 
I think supports my construal: 
The various creatures of the universe may meet with many external obstacles 
to their perfect development. But no obstacle can frustrate the development of 
the universe itself. The universe moulds and embraces all things. Therefore, 
we must admit the existence of that forth and final stage of being, which no 
power can assail. This is the stage of being on which the whole of nature 
depends. It is thus above all things and nothing has any power against it, and is 
the universal dwelling-place of reason and of wisdom”. (Cicero, originally 45 
BC, 1972, p. 137, emphasis added) 
In any case, whether or not my interpretation of Cicero is correct, it is quite common 
for pantheists and panentheists to construe God’s greatness in terms of 
encompassment. 
6 Modal possibilism says that some existent things are in the actual world and some 
other existent things are not in the actual world. Modal realism is an extreme form of 
modal possibilism. 
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object consisting of space and time, then perhaps the totality of all possible worlds is 
equivalent to logical space or a five-dimensional object consisting of space, time and 
modality. God, according to this view, is the most encompassing being because it 
extends maximally in space, time and modality. Nothing can extend further than such 
a being. 
Defending modal realism itself is outside the scope of this paper. However, one 
strategy that could motivate modal realism in this context would be to construct an 
argument similar to the ontological argument: That than which no greater can be 
thought is, according to modal panentheism, the totality of all possible worlds. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that some of the worlds in the totality of all 
possible worlds do not exist. It then follows that another totality can be thought that is 
greater than the totality of all possible worlds. Such a totality is thought to encompass 
all possible worlds and all of these worlds are thought to exist. However, it is 
contradictory to say that a being can be thought that is greater than the totality of all 
possible worlds because the totality of all possible worlds is, by definition, that than 
which no greater can be thought. Hence, it is impossible that some of the worlds in the 
totality of all possible worlds do not exist. Therefore, all possible worlds in the totality 
of all possible worlds exist. Therefore, modal realism is true.7 
I am aware that many, especially those who are critical of the ontological 
argument, would not find the above argument compelling. However, in this paper I 
will not discuss the soundness of the above argument or any other argument for modal 
realism. Instead, I try to motivate modal realism indirectly by showing how modal 
panentheism, which is based on modal realism, can solve a number of central 
problems in the philosophy of religion. 
 
3. Great-Making Properties 
We have seen that despite its uniqueness modal panentheism is, just like traditional 
theism, derived from the Anselmian definition of God as that than which no greater 
can be thought. Nevertheless, it still appears that modal panentheism differs radically 
from traditional theism. As we have seen, while traditional theism regards God as the 
being that has all possible positive qualities to the greatest possible extent, modal 
panentheism regards God as the totality of all possible worlds. I maintain, however, 
that the modal panentheistic God at least in some sense shares several properties with 
the traditional theistic God. 8  Such properties include omniscience, omnipotence, 
omnibenevolence, immutability, impassibility, eternity, necessary existence, 
omnipresence, independence, unsurpassability, and the property of being a cause of 
the universe. 
According to modal panentheism, God is the totality of all possible worlds, a 
being that encompasses all possible states of affairs and, moreover, all such possible 
worlds are real. This means that all possible instances of knowledge, power, and 
                                                          
7 The fact that we can construct a version of the ontological argument for modal 
realism/modal panentheism supports the point that the modal panentheistic concept of 
God is structurally parallel to the traditional theistic concept of God despite the fact 
that these concepts are based on distinct interpretations of God’s greatness. If 
however one is antecedently sceptical of modal realism, then the observation that we 
can construct a version of the ontological argument for modal realism/modal 
panentheism makes such a sceptic question modal realism even further. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for this point. 
8 Oppy (1997) and Steinhart (2004) make similar points.  
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benevolence are real and encompassed by God. This implies that, at least in one sense, 
the modal panentheistic God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent.9 (One 
might claim that the modal panentheistic God cannot be omniscient, omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent because although it encompasses all possible forms of knowledge, 
power, and benevolence it also encompasses all possible forms of ignorance, 
weakness and malevolence. Here is a possible response to such a claim: Consider, as a 
parallel example, a group of three people A, B and C. A knows x and y, B knows z, 
and C is totally ignorant. In this scenario, we are inclined to say that the group as a 
whole knows x, y and z and that the ignorance of C does not cancel out what A and B 
know. Similarly, the ignorance/weakness of an individual does not seem to undermine 
the knowledge/power of the totality to which the individual belongs. 
Omnibenevolence is more difficult to address but perhaps the same reasoning applies 
if Aquinas is right in saying that to sin is merely to fall short of a perfect action.10) 
Also, since the totality of all possible worlds is equivalent to logical space the 
modal panentheistic God is immutable, impassible, eternal and necessarily existent. 
The modal panentheistic God is also omnipresent and eternal in the sense that it 
encompasses all spatiotemporal locations in all possible worlds. 11  The modal 
panentheistic God is also independent because, as the totality of all possible worlds, 
its existence does not rely ontologically on any other existents. In fact, there is 
nothing external to God as there is nothing outside the totality of all possible worlds. 
The modal panentheistic God is also unsurpassable since there cannot be anything 
greater than the totality of all possible worlds; the totality of all possible worlds is the 
most encompassing being possible. Furthermore, the totality of all possible worlds 
can even be seen as a cause of the universe. A necessary being is commonly 
understood as a self-caused being that does not require any external cause of its 
existence. Since God, as the totality of all possible worlds, is a necessary being it is 
also a self-caused being. Now the totality here is assumed to encompass everything, 
including the universe. This means that, in one sense, the modal panentheistic God is 
a cause of the universe as well. 
                                                          
9 Notice that, if pantheism is true, God encompasses only all pieces of knowledge that 
exist in the actual world, all powers that exist in the actual world, and all forms of 
benevolence that exist in the actual world. This hardly entails that God is omniscient, 
omnipotent and omnibenevolent. 
10  There is a further question about the possession of knowledge, power and 
benevolence by the modal panentheistic God. It is assumed here that the modal 
panentheistic God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent because it subsumes 
all possible forms of knowledge, power and benevolence possessed by individuals. 
One might say, however, that this is an instance of the fallacy of composition because 
it is assumed erroneously here that if an individual has certain properties, the whole, 
which encompasses them, has these properties as well (thanks to Klaas Kraay for this 
perspective on this point). I do not have space to discuss this criticism in detail here 
but I believe that modal panentheists can respond to it. For example, they can appeal 
to the fact that we commonly attribute collective knowledge, collective power and 
collective morality (if not benevolence) to a group of people, such as a company.  
11 This of course does not mean that the modal panentheistic God is omnipresent and 
eternal in exactly the same sense in which the traditional theistic God is. In particular, 
modal panentheism does not entail that God is wholly present everywhere, undivided 
in His being. 
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Perhaps the only prominent properties of the traditional theistic God that the 
modal panentheistic God lacks are the property of being a person and the property of 
having free will. Traditional theism normally says that God is a person with free will. 
Modal panentheism does not ascribe such a property to God even though it entails that 
God encompasses all possible persons and all beings with free will. In this sense, 
perhaps God is a partially personal being or a partially free being even though it is not 
a free person in itself. In order to ascribe freedom and personhood to a thing there has 
to be an appropriate bearer of these properties. However, the totality of all possible 
worlds does not seem to qualify as a bearer of such properties.  
Nonetheless, as we have seen, the modal panentheistic God at least in some sense 
shares many properties with the traditional theistic God. It seems reasonable, 
therefore, to view modal panentheism as a form of theism, although ultimately, of 
course, it is a matter of definition whether or not any given view can be seen as a form 
of theism. 
 
4. Modal Panentheism and Problems in the Philosophy of Religion 
One of the main reasons to prefer modal panentheism to traditional theism is that it 
offers answers to many difficult problems in the philosophy of religion, answers that 
are not available to traditional theism. Such problems include the problem of evil, the 
problem of no best possible world, the fine-tuning problem, the timing problem for 
the beginning of the universe, and the question why there is anything at all.  
Consider the problem of evil first: 
 
The Problem of Evil: If an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God exists the 
actual world has to be free from evil. However, there certainly is evil in the 
actual world. Therefore, God does not exist.12 
 
Modal panentheism can quickly dismiss this problem. A hidden assumption in the 
above-stated version of the problem is that God is, if it exists at all, a being that would, 
given its omnipotence, omnibenevolence and free will, eliminate evil. Modal 
panentheism simply rejects this assumption by saying that it is a mistake to think that 
God is a being who performs morally significant actions using free will. God is, 
according to modal panentheism, the totality of all possible worlds and not a being 
with free will. This response is, however, not very interesting because it does not 
explain why there has to be evil in the first place. 
Modal panentheism explains the existence of evil as follows: Again, given modal 
realism all possible worlds exist. This means that every single possible state of affairs 
is instantiated. Many states of affairs that include evil—states of affairs which include 
instances of moral evil such as murders, rapes, terrorism, and slavery, and instances of 
natural evil such as disasters and catastrophes caused by earthquakes, tornados, floods 
and droughts—are metaphysically possible. If so, it is unavoidable that evil is 
instantiated. In sum, once we accept modal realism, it is necessarily the case that there 
is evil. 
But why does there have to be evil in the actual world instead of some other 
possible world? Why do we in the actual world have to suffer? Modal panentheism 
responds to these questions by saying that there is no reason that the actual world, 
instead of some other possible world, has to be free from evil. Modal realism does not 
                                                          
12  See Adams and Adams (1990), Peterson (1992), Plantinga (1974), and Rowe 
(2001). 
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privilege the actual world over other possible worlds. As we saw earlier, according to 
modal realism, actuality, which distinguishes the actual world from other possible 
worlds, is nothing but indexicality. That is, the actual world appears ontologically 
special to us merely because we happen to exist in the actual world. However, 
counterparts to us exist in other possible worlds similar to the actual world. If we do 
not suffer from evil, then our counterparts, who are as real as we are, must suffer from 
evil in their worlds. Given that we and our counterparts are morally equivalent, there 
is no reason for them to suffer instead of us, and vice versa. As Michael Almeida says, 
this is comparable to a situation in which a rescuer can save each of two persons but 
not both of them (Almeida 2011, p. 9). In such a situation, it is not legitimate to ask 
why person x rather than person y had to be rescued. Similarly, it is not legitimate to 
ask why the actual world rather than some other possible world has to contain evil.  
We can apply the same reasoning to many other problems in the philosophy of 
religion. Consider, for example, the following: 
 
The Problem of No Best Possible World: If there is an omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent God, then the actual world has to be the best possible world. 
However, the actual world certainly is not the best possible world. Therefore, 
God does not exist.13 
 
Notice how this problem differs from the problem of evil. The problem of no best 
possible world is not necessarily concerned with the existence of evil in the actual 
world. In fact, the problem would remain even if the actual world had been 
completely free from evil, as long as the actual world is not the best possible world. 
Leibniz famously bites the bullet and responds to the problem by saying that the 
actual world is the best possible world. However, most people disagree with him; it is 
easy to conceive of a possible world that is better than the actual world. For example, 
we can conceive of a world identical to the actual world except that a certain minor 
mishap in the actual world does not take place in that world. Modal panentheism 
responds to the problem of no best possible world in the same manner in which it 
responds to the problem of evil: (i) It is wrong to assume that God is a being with free 
will that would, given its omnipotence and omnibenevolence, create the best possible 
world; (ii) there exist worlds like the actual world that are not the greatest possible 
because all possible worlds exist; (iii) there is no reason to think that the actual world, 
instead of some other possible world, has to be the best possible world as all possible 
worlds are ontologically on a par. 
The problem of evil and the problem of no best possible world raise primarily 
moral concerns. They ask how an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God could be 
morally justified in creating the actual world given certain observed conditions of that 
world. Yet modal panentheism can also respond to problems that raise purely 
metaphysical concerns regarding the nature of our universe: 
 
The Fine-Tuning Problem: Some philosophers and scientists claim that the 
existence of life is grounded on an extremely delicate balance of initial 
conditions that obtained at the beginning of the universe. For example, 
Stephen Hawking estimates that if the rate of the universe’s expansion one 
second after the big bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred 
thousand million million, life could not have existed in the universe (Craig and 
                                                          
13 See Adams (1972), Kraay (2008), Langtry (2008) and Rowe (2004).  
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Sinnott-Armstrong 2004, p. 9). However, life does exist in the universe, which 
appears miraculous.14 
 
The Timing Problem for the Beginning of the Universe: According to scientists, 
the universe is approximately 15 billion years old. Why did the universe have 
to begin to exist 15 billion years ago? Whether the universe is created by God 
or through a natural process the age of the universe seems to be completely 
arbitrary.15 
 
The Problem of Why There is Anything at All: As J. J. C. Smart says, ‘That 
anything exists at all does seem . . . a matter for the deepest awe’ (Smart 1955, 
p. 194). Biology might explain why there are animals and plants, and 
cosmology might explain why there are planets and galaxies. However, why 
there is anything at all rather than nothing is the deepest metaphysical mystery 
that no one seems able to answer.16 
 
The fine-tuning problem might not arise if, as the multiverse hypothesis says, there 
are infinitely many universes in the actual world. However, even if there can be only 
one universe in each possible world, this problem does not arise for modal 
panentheism. This is because modal panentheism can still allow infinitely many 
universes by letting each possible world in the totality of all possible worlds (i.e., 
infinitely many possible worlds) contain one universe. Modal panentheism says that it 
is not surprising that there is a fine-tuned universe because there are infinitely many 
universes subject to infinitely many conditions across possible worlds. Why the actual 
world contains a fine-tuned universe is not a question for modal panentheism because, 
again, modal realism does not discriminate among possible worlds. 
In response to the timing problem modal panentheism says that there are, in the 
totality of all possible worlds, infinitely many universes of an infinite variety of ages, 
and our 15-billion-year-old universe is only one of them. It is not surprising that there 
is a universe that is 15 billion years old because, given modal realism, some world has 
to contain such a universe. Why the actual world has to contain such a universe is not 
a legitimate question because, again, the actual world and other possible worlds are 
ontologically on a par. 
The question why there is anything at all might not arise if there cannot be an 
empty world.17 However, even if there can be an empty world, this problem does not 
arise for modal panentheism. It just happens to be the case that the actual world is not 
an empty world. There is no reason to think that the actual world, instead of some 
other possible world, has to be empty. 
Notice that each of the problems that we have seen focuses on a ‘mystery’ 
concerning a specific condition of the actual world that appears incompatible with the 
existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God or that, by itself, appears totally 
arbitrary or probabilistically/metaphysically unlikely to obtain. The problem of evil 
asks why there is evil in the actual world given the existence of an omnipotent and 
                                                          
14 See also, Barrow and Tipler (1988), Carr (2007), and Leslie (1996). 
15 See Leftow (1991). G. W. Leibniz also addresses the question ‘Why didn’t God 
create everything a year sooner than he did?’ in his exchange with Samuel Clark in 
1716. 
16 See Goldschmidt (2013), Kuhn (2007), Leslie and Kuhn (2013) and Rundle (2004).   
17 See Baldwin (1996), Efird and Stoneham (2005), and van Inwagen (1996). 
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omnibenevolent God. The problem of no best possible world asks why the actual 
world is not the best possible world given the existence of an omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent God. The fine-tuning problem asks why the actual world has to 
contain a universe that is fine-tuned when it is probabilistically very unlikely. The 
timing problem asks why the actual world has to contain a universe that is 15 billion 
years old, which seems arbitrary. The question why there is anything at all asks why 
there is something rather than nothing in the actual world, which seems 
metaphysically unlikely. 
Modal panentheism can respond to any problem within the same logical structure. 
It says that all possible worlds exist and are equally real, so there is no special reason 
that the actual world—that is, one of infinitely many possible worlds—has a specific 
condition. If we consider the converse of this point we can derive an interesting 
conclusion: all of these ‘mysteries’ arise because we assume erroneously that the 
actual world is the only possible world that exists. Once we give up such an 
assumption these mysteries disappear. 
 
5. The Problem of Evil for Modal Panentheism 
In the previous section, I argued that the problem of evil is among problems in the 
philosophy of religion that modal panentheism can resolve. Accordingly I have shown 
that the following three questions do not raise serious concerns for modal 
panentheism: 
 
Q1: Why is there evil given the existence of God as an omniscient, omnipotent 
and omnibenevolent free being? 
Q2: Why is there evil at all? 
Q3: Why is there evil in the actual world, i.e., our world? 
 
First, Q1 cannot be directed against modal panentheism. This is because Q1 is based 
on an assumption that modal panentheism rejects, namely, the assumption that God is 
a being that can freely choose to eliminate evil. Second, modal panentheism 
successfully responds to Q2 by saying that every single possible state of affairs is 
instantiated in the totality of all possible worlds, which is, according to modal 
panentheism, identical with God. Given that it is possible for evil states of affairs to 
be instantiated, it is not a surprise that they are instantiated in the totality. Third, Q3 is 
not a legitimate question for modal panentheism because, according to modal 
panentheism, all possible worlds are ontologically on a par. Since the actual world is 
by no means privileged it is not a question why our world, rather than some other 
possible world, includes evil. 
It is a great strength of modal panentheism in contrast to traditional theism that 
it can offer straightforward answers to the above questions concerning evil. However, 
ironically, modal panentheism faces a different form of the problem of evil because of 
its own unique feature. In what follows, I argue that this problem raises a serious 
challenge for modal panentheism. 
The problem that modal panentheism faces is a variation of the following 
problem that pantheism faces: 
 
The Problem of Evil for Pantheism: Pantheism says that God is identical with 
the actual world. However, there certainly is evil in the actual world and God is 
not an evil being. Therefore, pantheism is false. 
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The actual world includes many awful instances of moral and natural evil. Pantheism 
has to say that these instances are part of God and yet it is difficult to regard anything 
that includes instances of evil to be God. This problem is based on the following 
question: 
 
Q4: Why is there evil in the world if God is identical with the world? 
 
This question is distinct from Q1, Q2 and Q3 as it is directed specifically to pantheism. 
The problem of evil for pantheism is powerful because pantheists cannot undercut it 
by making typical moves that traditional theists make in response to the problem of 
evil. For example, pantheists cannot appeal to the free will theodicy by saying that 
God is not responsible for evil because evil is caused by free humans. This is because 
even if evil is caused by free humans pantheists still have to hold that free humans 
themselves are part of God. Whatever free humans do is, according to pantheism, part 
of God. Neither can they appeal to the soul-making theodicy by saying that evil is 
necessary for the spiritual growth of humans beyond their physical existence. This is 
because pantheism holds that there is no reality beyond the physical reality that 
humans inhabit. Neither can they appeal to sceptical theism by saying that, while our 
epistemic limitations do not allow us to fully comprehend God’s reason, evil is 
necessary in God’s grand scheme beyond the natural world. This is because 
pantheism is not compatible with the existence of a God that has a grand scheme 
beyond the physical reality. 
The bad news for modal panentheism is that the problem of evil for pantheism 
intensifies when it is applied to modal panentheism.  
 
The Problem of Evil for Modal Panentheism: Modal panentheism says that 
God is identical with the totality of all possible worlds. However, the totality of 
all possible worlds includes all possible instances of evil, including the very 
worst possible instances of evil, and God is not an evil being. Therefore, modal 
panentheism is false. 
 
This problem is based on the following question: 
 
Q5: Why are there the worst possible instances of evil in the totality of all 
possible worlds if God is identical with it? 
 
This question is distinct from Q1–Q4 above as it is directed specifically to modal 
panentheism. We have seen that pantheists cannot undercut Q4 by making moves that 
traditional theists typically make in response to the problem of evil, and neither can 
modal panentheists undercut Q5 by making such moves. 
The problem of evil for modal panentheism is more intractable than the 
problem of evil for pantheism. While pantheism entails only the thesis that all actual 
instances of evil (i.e., all instances of evil in the actual world) are part of God, modal 
panentheism entails the much stronger thesis that all possible instances of evil (i.e., all 
instances of evil in all possible worlds), including the very worst possible instances of 
evil, are part of God. This means that modal panentheism entails that there is, as part 
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of God, a state of affairs in which, for example, millions of innocent children are 
tortured for an extended period, possibly eternally, for no reason.18 
Again, modal panentheism adopts the interpretation of God’s greatness that is not 
based on the degree of positivity or great-making but on the scope of that which it 
encompasses. Hence, according to modal panentheism, the more encompassing a 
being is the higher the greatness of that being is. The amount of evil that God 
subsumes therefore actually enhances, rather than diminishes, the greatness of God.  
Conversely, if God fails to encompass some evil state of affairs (or any state of 
affairs at all) it fails to qualify as the greatest possible being on this interpretation. 
However, it is highly counterintuitive to think that utterly awful states of affairs are 
part of God if God is worthy of religious veneration. What this observation seems to 
teach us is that it is not correct to interpret God’s greatness in terms of 
encompassment. While modal realism might not be an incoherent metaphysical view 
and it depends on one’s definition of God whether the totality of all possible worlds is 
identified with God according to modal realism, such a definition entails disturbing 
moral implications which are difficult to accept. 
One might think that we can solve this problem by appealing to Lewis’s 
defence of modal realism. Modal realism faces a moral problem that is related to the 
problem of evil for modal panentheism. The moral problem for modal realism is this: 
Given the claim of modal realism that all possible worlds exist, the total amount of 
good and evil does not change whether or not we act morally in the actual world. 
Whether or not we act morally to prevent and eliminate evil in the actual world, the 
same evil is instantiated in some other possible world anyway. Therefore, modal 
realism appears to discourage us from acting morally. 
Lewis’s response to this problem is that evil events in other possible worlds 
should not be our moral concern. He writes: 
For those of us who think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and 
respect and esteem, loyalties and affections and solidarity, the other-worldly 
evils should not seem even momentarily relevant to morality. Of course our 
moral aims are egocentric. And likewise all the more for those who think of 
morality in terms of rules, rights, and duties; or as obedience to the will of 
God (Lewis 1986, p. 127).19 
One might try to apply similar reasoning to the problem of evil for modal 
panentheism and maintain that we should not be bothered that there are utterly awful 
evil states of affairs in worlds other than the actual world. When we talk about what is 
good and what is evil, one might say, our main concern is what is good and what is 
evil in our world and our moral concerns should not extend to other possible worlds 
that are causally and spatiotemporally isolated from the actual world. And, given the 
laws of nature and other contingent facts, evil that can be instantiated in the actual 
world is only finite in quality and quantity. However, such a response does not 
succeed in saving modal panentheism. Lewis might be right in saying that we should 
                                                          
18 An anonymous referee says that it is not clear how the problem of evil intensifies 
for modal panentheism because the amount of evil that occurs is irrelevant to the 
difficulty or seriousness of the problem. I agree with the referee that a single instance 
of evil is sufficient to formulate the problem of evil, but the problem is strengthened 
significantly if all possible instances of evil, including the very worst possible 
instances of evil, are obtained. That would constitute the quantitatively and 
qualitatively most significant form of the problem of horrendous evil (Adams 1999). 
19 For the moral implications of modal realism see Adams (1979) and Heller (2003). 
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not be bothered by evil in other possible worlds when considering the moral 
significance of actions in our own world. That is, even though the total axiological 
value and the total amount of good and evil in the sum of all possible worlds do not 
change whatever action we perform, we should not be discouraged from acting 
morally in the actual world. Yet this does not entail that we should not be bothered by 
evil in other possible worlds in relation to the thesis that the totality of all possible 
worlds is identical with God. The adoption of an egocentric point of view allows us to 
set aside other possible worlds in considering our moral actions but it does not allow 
us to set aside other possible worlds in considering the totality of all possible worlds 
identified as God. It is still puzzling how the totality of all possible worlds could be 
worthy of religious veneration if it includes so much evil. 
The problem of evil for modal panentheism is intractable. It seems more 
intractable than any other forms of the problem of evil, as it involves, quantitatively 
and qualitatively, the most significant instances of evil, which exist, according to 
modal panentheism, as part of God. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Modal panentheism offers a unique alternative to the traditional concept of God. It 
coheres with the Anselmian definition of God as that than which no greater can be 
thought (at least on a certain interpretation) and preserves some of the great-making 
properties that are commonly ascribed to God (again, at least on a certain 
interpretation). It also offers answers to many fundamental problems in the 
philosophy of religion and shows that apparent mysteries on which these problems are 
based are not actually mysteries. However, it faces its own problem. The problem of 
evil is widely recognised as one of the most difficult challenges to traditional theism 
but a variation of the problem that modal panentheism faces seems to be even more 
difficult.20 
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